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Abstract The professional and institutional responsibility
for handling genetic knowledge is well discussed; less
attention has been paid to how lay people and particularly
people who are affected by genetic diseases perceive and
frame such responsibilities. In this exploratory study we
qualitatively examine the attitudes of lay people, patients
and relatives of patients in Germany and Israel towards
genetic testing. These attitudes are further examined in the
national context of Germany and Israel, which represent
opposite regulatory approaches and bioethical debates
concerning genetic testing. Three major themes of
responsibility emerged from the inter-group and cross-
cultural comparison: self-responsibility, responsibility for
kin, and responsibility of society towards its members.
National contrast was apparent in the moral reasoning of
lay respondents concerning, for example, the right not to
know versus the duty to know (self-responsibility) and the
moral conﬂict concerning informing kin versus the moral
duty to inform (responsibility for kin). Attitudes of
respondents affected by genetic diseases were, however,
rather similar in both countries. We conclude by discussing
how moral discourses of responsibility are embedded
within cultural (national, religious) as well as phenome-
nological (being affected) narratives, and the role of public
engagement in bioethical discourse.
Keywords Genetic responsibility  Being affected 
Public moralities  Cross-cultural bioethics  Germany 
Israel
Introduction
The importance of adding the perspective of lay moralities
to the bioethical discussion of new medical technologies
has already been acknowledged, especially in tandem with
the increasing role played by the social sciences in the
bioethical enterprise (De Vries et al. 2007; De Vries and
Kim 2008) and through the creation of ‘‘empirical ethics’’
(Borry et al. 2004, 2005). We compare here for the ﬁrst
time lay attitudes towards genetic testing in Germany and
Israel, two countries that offer much for a comparative
analysis given their very distinctive approach to regulating
genetic testing (Wertz and Fletcher 1989; Hashiloni-Dolev
2007; Gottweis and Prainsack 2006). This study follows
the idea that lay people including those affected by genetic
diseases provide a richness and complexity of arguments in
assessing genetic research and bioethical problems (Scully
et al. 2004; Banks et al. 2006). We further ask how the
effect of different nation-speciﬁc worldviews can be
moderated by the lived experience of being affected
(Kleinman et al. 1997; Kleinman 1999). This opens up the
possibility that values shared across countries could also be
culturally informed, for example by values associated with
disability that transcend national contrasts.
Recently, lay perspectives on genetic research and
genetic testing are gaining more legitimacy and inﬂuence
through patients’ organizations and advocacy groups (Kerr
et al. 1998; Petersen 2006; Novas 2006, 2007; Raz 2009).
These lay perspectives join the mainstream institutional
discussion concerning how to regulate genetic testing so as
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(Chadwick et al. 1999; Chadwick and Thompson 1999;
Wolf 1995). We concentrate on genetic testing of adults,
which includes carrier and predisposition testing. This is an
important area of the new genetics which increases the
range of choices open to the healthcare consumer (Slow-
ther 2008; Vallance and Ford 2003). In general, responsi-
bility involves moral and philosophical questions of
causality, control and justiﬁcation (Fischer and Ravizza
1998; Jonas 1979, 1985; Feinberg 1970;L u ¨bbe 1994),
which in the context of genetic testing raise questions of
respecting self-determination, discreetness, determinism
and prevention (Chadwick et al. 1997; Rhodes 1998; Ta-
kala and Ha ¨yry 2000; Andre et al. 2000). However, most of
the work done in this ﬁeld concentrates on expert respon-
sibility which is discussed from a professional and uni-
versalistic point of view. A few studies have shown the
existence of contesting lay concepts of ‘‘genetic responsi-
bility’’ in attitudes towards predictive genetic testing of
adults (Hallowell 1999; Konrad 2003, 2005; Taylor 2004).
Our research further complements these studies by adding
a cross-cultural comparison.
After introducing the comparative framework of Israel
and Germany and the methodology used in this study, we
describe the themes expressed by the respondents and focus
on a comparative analysis. Responsibility, a central and
multi-faceted theme that emanated from the discussions in
both countries, will be presented in a multi-layered fash-
ion—moving from self-responsibility, via responsibility for
kin, to the responsibility of society towards its members.
We conclude by discussing how moral discourses of
responsibility are embedded within cultural (national,
religious) as well as phenomenological (being affected)
narratives, and the role of public engagement in bioethical
discourse.
Comparing Israel and Germany in the context
of genetic testing
In Wertz and Fletcher’s (1989) international survey, Ger-
man geneticists expressed extreme caution regarding the
use of prenatal diagnosis (PND) for selective abortion,
while Israeli geneticists advocated it. Hashiloni-Dolev
(2007) further located these differences within the thriving
social, legal and ethical debate concerning reprogenetic
technologies in Germany, as opposed to its absence in
Israel. While German political, feminist, and disability
rights groups actively oppose genetic technology, disability
activists in Israel support the use of PND to prevent life
with disability (Raz 2004). As Gottweis and Prainsack
(2006) show, in Germany the production of human
embryonic stem cells is legally forbidden and pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is contested because
of the moral protection of the human embryo (see also
Krones et al. 2005), while in Israel both practices are
strongly supported. While genetic testing is practiced in
Germany and Israel on a personal choice basis, in Israel
there is also a national screening program for genetic dis-
eases such as Tay-Sachs, Cystic Fibrosis, and familial
dysautonomia (Zlotogora and Leventhal 2000). In Ger-
many, the issue of genetic screening is discussed separately
from and with much more caution than individual genetic
testing, partly due to the spectre of Nazi eugenics (Enqu-
ete-Kommission 2002; Schroeder-Kurth 1999).
Methodology
Our point of departure for an integrative analysis of soci-
ology and ethics is that empirical social science could be
seen as providing descriptive ‘facts’ that can be ethically
studied as normative statements (Haimes 2002). First, we
add to the expert discourse of abstract and formal ethical
principles the moral reasoning of lay people, which is
ambivalent, informal and ‘‘unprincipled’’—a morality
without foundations which is nevertheless the morality we
‘live by.’ Second, we add a contextual focus on social
categories—in our case lay, affected (here deﬁned as
patients or close relative of a patient, see Schicktanz et al.
2008), religious, and national groupings. In addition to
providing empirical data for ethical analysis, the socio-
logical analysis of the focus groups and interviews enables
new questions to be asked, such as ‘why are these issues
deﬁned as ethical concerns by these people in these times
and these places?’ or more concretely: ‘why is responsi-
bility as moral duty, rather than a moral conﬂict, preferred
in the context of genetic testing of adults by certain people
in Germany and/or in Israel?’ Such questions can then be
further discussed as indicators of broader concerns and
comparative cultural narratives within Germany and Israel.
The methodology therefore consists of several iterations
between social science and moral philosophy in order to
strive for an empirically-informed integration (Birnbacher
1988; van der Scheer and Widdershoven 2004; Borry et al.
2005).
All of the respondents (N = 48) in this exploratory and
qualitative study were volunteers recruited in Germany
(Berlin) and Israel (Beer-Sheva, Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv)
during 2005–2007. In Germany, two focus groups were
conducted.
1 In Israel, three focus groups were held with lay
1 The German focus groups were recruited, organized and conducted
by the Research Group on Bioethics and Science Communication at
the Max-Delbru ¨ck-Center for Molecular Medicine Berlin-Buch in the
beginning of 2005 in the framework of the EU-Project ‘‘Challenges of
Biomedicine’’, Contract No. SAS6-CT-2003-510238.
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123people and 10 people affected by genetic diseases were
interviewed individually, as per their preference. All 32
Israeli respondents were Jewish by birth but only seven
deﬁned themselves as religious. Seven of the 16 German
respondents deﬁned themselves as Protestants, seven as
atheists, and the remaining two were a Buddhist and a
Muslim. Similar scenarios and questions were used in the
focus groups and individual interviews (Carter and Hen-
derson 2005; Bloor et al. 2001). Focus groups in Israel and
Germany included 7–8 people and lasted about 2 h; indi-
vidual interviews lasted about 1 h on average. The age
range across all respondents was 18–65 with an average of
34. In terms of formal education, all participants had a
high-school diploma; 58 and 42% of the German and
Israeli respondents, respectively, had a BA-level university
degree. The groups’ composition was heterogeneous with
respect to socio-demographic criteria like age, educational
level and religion. There were slightly more women than
men in each group. On the basis of their self-assessment in
the pre-questionnaire, the selected participants were ascri-
bed the status ‘lay’ or ‘affected’ according to their personal
experience.
German respondents affected by genetic diseases were
recruited from self-help and support organizations and
included people who tested positive, or had children who
tested positive, for a variety of genetic diseases/conditions
including Marfan syndrome, muscular dystrophy, dwarf-
ism, and cystic ﬁbrosis. Israeli respondents affected by
genetic diseases were recruited from organizations of and
for people with genetic diseases and included people who
tested positive, or had children who tested positive, for a
variety of genetic diseases/conditions including cystic
ﬁbrosis, Prader-Willi Syndrome, Rett Syndrome, and
thalassemia. The category of ‘‘being affected’’ is thus
comprised in this study of people who either have genetic
diseases or have children with genetic diseases. After
ﬁnding that similar views were expressed by these two
subgroups, we decided to amalgamate them for the purpose
of this study into one group. Of note, while differences in
attitudes between people who have genetic diseases and
people who have children with genetic diseases have been
found in the context of prenatal testing, our focus in this
study is on carrier testing of adults, and many of the parents
of children with genetic diseases have themselves gone
through genetic counselling following the birth of the
affected child. German and Israeli respondents not affected
by genetic diseases were recruited by disseminating ﬂyers
and ads in urban public places.
Questions asked in the focus groups and interviews
included attitudes towards genetic testing of adults, such
as: Who inﬂuences the decision to test (family members,
partners, health professionals, the state and so on), when
and how; who is seen as responsible for making the
decision and why; who is seen as having the authority to
decide and what are the sources of such authority (religion,
morality, the law and so on). Respondents were not pro-
vided with any preliminary instruction since we were
interested in their ordinary attitudes. Scenarios regarding
carrier testing of adults (for example in the context of
breast cancer) were used in Germany and Israel to provide
a concrete narrative that invites participants to imagine a
real case, to consider what other information they would
need to know to make a judgment, to consider the reasons
and motives of signiﬁcant others, and so on. Group dis-
cussions and interviews were audio recorded and tran-
scribed. The authors analyzed the transcripts from each
country thematically, then translated them from Hebrew
and German into English and compared the themes cross-
nationally in order to uncover discursive categories recur-
ring within and across groups (Denzin and Lincoln 1994).
The quotations given illustrate the range of responses with
regard to the emerging themes. After analyzing the
‘national’ themes in detail for their contents and argu-
ments, we focused on the comparison of similar cross-
cultural themes.
Empirical analysis: genetic testing as a locus
of responsibility
The issue of responsibility emerged as a central and multi-
faceted theme in the moral deliberations of German and
Israeli respondents. Genetic testing was discussed by a few
of the German and Israeli respondents as negating
responsibility, i.e., regarding genetic causes as relieving
one’s personal responsibility for the disease, since if a
disease is inherited, the parents are held responsible.
However, this minority view was criticised by most of the
respondents, who argued that the fact that these risks are
involuntary does not absolve gene carriers of responsi-
bility for their health. Indeed, as Hallowell (1999, p. 599)
found, ‘‘because genetic risks are portrayed as part of the
individual’s make up their responsibility to act to protect
their health, or the health of future generations, is
emphasized, for inherited risk cannot be blamed upon
external sources.’’
The majority view thus regarded genetic testing as a
source of responsibility concerning one’s lifestyle and
relatives as well as the responsibility of society towards
pre-symptomatic ‘patients.’
For the majority of German and Israeli respondents,
genetic testing of adults without the option of a therapy was
regarded very skeptically. Since merely the knowledge
alone could induce psychological stress as well as social
surveillance and discrimination, it could cause a disease
escalation. Pre-symptomatic or carrier testing that only
Moral attitudes of patients, relatives and lay people in Germany and Israel 435
123produced statements of risk probabilities were therefore
regarded by the majority of German respondents as
inadvisable:
But I believe that if you get signs in that manner, […]
this will also lead to a state of panic or perhaps even
to paranoia. And I believe that this is not necessarily
positive for … your quality of life. (Female, German,
not affected by genetic disease)
This criticism was more elaborated on amongst German
respondents. For example, it was linked by some German
respondents to the broader context of the social construc-
tion of illness. It was argued that since some genetic con-
ditions (e.g., dwarﬁsm) are socially constructed as a
handicap, testing for them, generally speaking, is yet
another mechanism of this social construction:
Well, my maternal grandparents were relatively small
people but they did not suffer from dwarﬁsm […] But
now doctors are quite sure that my son is suffering
from delayed growth. (Female, German, family
affected by dwarﬁsm)
In addition, a small group of German respondents, who
were mainly non-affected and presented themselves as
Protestant, stressed their will to ‘‘take things as they come’’
(female, affected as mother from a son with hereditary
dwarﬁsm). If no concrete actions or consequences were
deducible from the test, according to these respondents,
they would object to ‘‘knowing what destiny holds’’. This
right not to know could be seen as objection of self-
responsibility as there is no causality nor this knowledge
will have no consequences. Individuals who presented for
Huntington’s Disease (HD) predictive testing similarly
defended the right, in principle, of at-risk individuals ‘‘not
to know’’ their HD gene status (Taylor 2004). This ‘right
not to know’ was mentioned by our respondents as an
individual, personal right but not as a general argument
against passing genetic information.
I myself wouldn’t like to know. And I think, what is
the good of having this forecast? And the ﬁrst ques-
tion would be whether this is bound to come true.
(Male, German, not affected by genetic disease)
However, as long as the genetic test could have medi-
cally therapeutic or preventive consequences, most of the
German and Israeli participants were in favor of it. This
agreement was the basis for a perceived self-responsibility
associated with genetic testing. Most of the respondents
agreed that even though genetic testing will not prevent the
disease, at an early stage of detection it could prolong life
and increase one’s opportunities:
In my case this Marfan Syndrome […] Well, it has
affected my vascular system. That’s why I had to
have a heart transplantation 8 years ago. I mean, if
you know right from the start that you have a certain
disease, you’ll cope with it differently. For example
not participating in sports in order not to overstrain
yourself. (Female, German, affected by genetic
disease)
I’m also of the opinion that if I had known this earlier
I would not have done certain things. […] the med-
ication could really have started earlier. (Female,
German, affected by an undiagnosed hereditary
disease)
Many participants—especially women but also men, in
Germany and Israel—mentioned breast cancer as a disease
which is potentially curable if detected early. They stated
they would like to take a genetic test, especially if there
was further information such as for example the occurrence
of breast cancer in their family:
If for example you come from a family with a history
of breast cancer and if it was possible to say with the
help of a genetic test whether it could be passed to
your own children, you would keep an eye on
everything right from the outset. Because breast
cancer is for example curable, if detected early.
(Female, German, affected by genetic disease)
If you tested positive for it, then you become more
watchful for additional medical examinations. Instead
of having mammograms once a while, you have one
every six months. (Female, Israeli, not affected by
genetic disease)
I have relatives who have to go for testing since their
parents had died from the same thing. It can be pre-
vented if you have the testing done and remove the
polyp. (Male, Israeli, affected by genetic disease)
While the potential stress that might follow a positive
test was also mentioned by some of the respondents, it was
weighted against the potential beneﬁts of the test:
The stress can be like a black cloud hanging over
your head while chances are you are not necessarily
going to get cancer. But then again it might also help
you. (Female, Israeli, not affected by genetic disease)
The majority of the respondents describe a concept of self-
responsibilitywhichparallelsthe‘self-government’(Lemke
2002, 2005; Novas and Rose 2000) of one’s own behaviour
and body. It includes the consquentialistic idea of control-
ling one’s life style and health behaviour (i.e., periodic
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123medical tests) in light of future outcomes. Some Israeli
respondents also supported genetic testing on the basis of
belonging to a high-risk group:
There are no genetic problems in my family at
present, but I am not so sure about previous genera-
tions since many have gone in the Holocaust. You
know, Ashkenazi Jews have more mutations than
others, so you cannot be too careful. It is better to do
the test, just to be on the safe side, and then see what
are the implications. (Female, Israeli, not affected by
genetic disease)
This shared view of genetic risk, which means that
belonging to a certain group such as Ashkenazi Jews
results in a higher genetic risk for the group member than
other persons, was also expressed by a few Israeli
respondents in the form of what they regarded as a ‘duty
to know’:
Even if in my own family there are no cases of
cancer, just being an Ashkenazi woman means that I
am under greater risk and should consider testing. It
also makes sense to pay for the predictive test, since,
if you are a carrier, it means that you have to do the
screening more frequently, and maybe the State will
subsidize it in case you are a carrier. (Female, Israeli,
not affected by genetic disease)
Some Israeli respondents also referred to the duty to know
as part of one’s required health maintenance which even
has religious orientation:
There is the Jewish principle of the overriding value
of curing, and it is our religious duty to make an
effort (hishtadlut). Efforts to intervene in nature, for
example through predictive testing, is in principle
taking the powers with which God endowed us and
putting them to good use. (Male, Israeli, affected by
genetic disease)
Here, the idea of self-responsibility to undergo a genetic
test seems to be justiﬁed not only because of future
consequences but as part of a particular Jewish identity.
Some of the German respondents who were affected by
genetic diseases also spoke—in a parallel manner to lay
and affected Israeli respondents—about the duty to know
and to tell close family members:
I’d consider it to be my duty. Yes. Well, I’ve always
kept my relatives informed of how my disease made
its way through the genes of my family […] When
everything, I mean, all the trouble has started, well, I
told her [my sister] that it’s a thing which can be
transmitted by men. But if these women have babies
themselves, this may/their children may be, well,
disabled. (Male, German, affected by hereditary
disease)
This issue of knowing the genetic information and passing
it to kin, regarded as a duty by many Israeli respondents—
both affected and not affected—as well as by affected
German respondents, brings us to the theme of responsi-
bility to one’s kin.
Responsibility for kin
Kenen (1994) and Hallowell (1999) argue that the
increasing availability of genetic information results in
individuals acquiring an obligation to reveal genetic
information about themselves to their kin. In contrast,
Konrad (2003, 2005) describes the negotiation of
(non)disclosure as a moral conﬂict. Taylor (2004) describes
the decision to test as morally contingent on the perceived
need of oneself and signiﬁcant others for the genetic test
information and the capacity to tolerate, manage and live
with such information. While the former view was
described by respondents in the context of breast cancer
and potential preventive treatment, the latter is linked to
Huntington’s Disease and no pre-emptive treatment. These
two opposite narratives of responsibility for kin—moral
duty versus moral conﬂict—were also present amongst our
respondents. These two kinds of responsibility could be
seen as two sides of the same coin, as in both cases it is
about the moral care for people you loves and feel bonded
to.
While non-affected German respondents saw a moral
conﬂict in passing the information, affected respondents
stressed that there is a moral duty to do so. Of note, we did
not ﬁnd any clear gendered patterns within or across the
groups. The non-affected view preferred the protection of
the kin’s right not to know—thus protecting them from too
much information that could cause futile anxiety:
I have a younger sister. […] she is very emotional.
And this means, that she nurses bad news for a very
long time. And no matter if there is a real reason for it
or not. […]. And this means, that if I told her, I knew
that she probably would nurse it for the rest of her
life. That she, no matter if she really fell ill or not,
during the rest of her life she would have a fear that
she might fall ill. And this could have a permanent
inﬂuence on her life. (German, male, not affected)
The moral conﬂict was described as consisting of, on the
one hand, the moral responsibility towards kin, but on the
other hand the recognition that how to handle such
information is a genuinely individual decision—especially
information about health and the body, which everybody
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respondent said, caused by the knowledge itself:
I don’t want to say that I would consider it my duty
to, but for reasons of morality, I do think that I would
tell. Just because of, should something really happen,
that nobody makes an issue out of it later by saying:
Heavens! You really knew something. You under-
went the test. Why didn’t you inform us? … It cer-
tainly is very difﬁcult. […] Well, maybe they say:
and now you got us all into a real mess, […]T h i s
certainly is the big problem with genetic tests.
(German, Male, not affected)
But it is really astonishing, what a responsibility such
knowledge may cause. […] you should be aware of it
right from the start. Then there is the question, well,
what does the responsibility include? I mean to say,
am I only responsible for myself alone? I do not need
to tell it to somebody else, because it is my case, my
life, my disease or my susceptibility. Or you are so,
do I quite have the responsibility to say: Well, when I
have this susceptibility to it, you as my sister has it as
well and that is why I am responsible for your life,
too. (German, female, not affected)
The majority of German affected respondents agreed on the
moral duty to inform family members, especially if it could
have relevance for planning life and reproduction, partic-
ularly in terms of potential children’s health. Such
responsibility can thus be regarded as entailing both self-
government and the government of others.
I also have a brother and he told me that he also
wanted to have children. Well, after I had read up on
it, I told him that he might transmit the Marfan
Syndrome. He had an examination. But as I said
before, time went by and they [the doctors] haven’t
received the results of the tests yet. So he has two
children now […]. And they are as ﬁt as a ﬁddle.
Even though one of his children is a bit like my
daughter, well, a little bit -always a bit cool, always a
bit different. Well. I observe that from a distance and
tell him every now and then to […] keep an eye on it.
That’s all I can do. (German, female, affected)
The majority of Israeli respondents, both affected and
not affected, also agreed about the moral duty to pass the
information to one’s kin:
My father told me that he was diagnosed with a heart
condition that has a genetic basis. I think it was his
duty to tell me that so that I can be aware and take
measures regarding myself and my children. For
example, my son will be in the military next year, and
this information means that he should take the test too
– if he has the condition or a potential to develop it,
this might have consequences for his military service.
(Israeli, female, affected)
Of course, I would like my kin to tell me about
positive or negative genetic test results, and I would
do the same for them. It is part of being a family and
caring for each other. Even if there are no medica-
tions or pre-emptive treatment for the genetic con-
dition, I would still want to be told – it is possible that
in the future some treatment would be available.
(Israeli, female, not affected)
Responsibility of society towards its members
In this section we refer to several themes that relate to the
perception of the responsibility of society concerning
economic and discriminatory aspects of genetic testing of
adults. Of note, none of the respondents mentioned a per-
sonal responsibility for society. In that sense there was no
argument related to eugenics or population genetics. Most
German respondents voiced concern that because of its
costs, only the rich would have access to genetic tests of
adults:
No health scheme will pay for it […] Anyone who
has to live on social security would not have the
money to undergo a genetic test. This is a social
question of responsibility. (Male, German, not
affected by genetic disease)
Most Israeli respondents did not share the German
respondents’ critical outlook concerning the linkage
between genetic testing of adults and health disparities. On
the contrary, the majority expressed the view that such
testing has already become ‘‘a public matter,’’ made
available to everyone through State-supported and subsi-
dized screening programs:
It’s like the national carrier screening program for
Tay Sachs that we have. It’s for everyone, and people
take it without having to pay. I expect that such
services will be increasingly offered to the public in
the context of genetic diseases that are prevalent in
the Jewish population. (Male, Israeli, not affected by
genetic disease)
We are all in the same boat in this matter so I expect
testing will be subsidized by HMOs [Health Man-
agement Organizations]. It is a simple cost-beneﬁt
calculation for the State or the health organization. It
should be cheaper to test and prevent suffering than
not to test and then treat. (Female, Israeli, affected by
genetic disease)
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information were voiced by most of the respondents,
German and Israeli, and there was a consensus that genetic
information should always be kept conﬁdential unless
otherwise decided by the patient. Especially with respect to
insurance companies, a fear was expressed that genetic data
on predispositions could amplify the current erosion of
solidarity in the ﬁeld of insurance coverage. Another view
on discrimination was expressed by some affected German
respondents and Israeli respondents (both affected and not
affected), who related to such genetic information as a
potential source of afﬁrmative action or ‘positive
discrimination’:
If I knew in advance that I had this inherited defect, I
would go to the doctor every three months and have a
mammogram made. The health insurance would pay
for it then. (German, female, affected)
Doctors always tell us how preventive medicine saves
millions of dollars. I guess if I found out I was pre-
symptomatic for breast cancer that would mean being
entitled to discounted preventive treatments. It’s the
same as the state paying for amniocentesis of preg-
nant women who already have children with inherited
diseases. (Israeli, male, not affected)
Comparing the themes between the groups
and cross-culturally
Three major themes concerning responsibility emerged
from the empirical analysis: self-responsibility, responsi-
bility for kin, and the responsibility of society. A com-
parison of these themes between Germany and Israel
(summarized in Table 1) supports the following
generalizations:
A practical consensus emerged in regard to a positive
view of genetic testing, as long as it could lead to an
improvement in life through changes in lifestyle or pre-
ventive treatment. This practical line of reasoning was also
found in other studies among various populations showing
that in making such a decision people take into account
factors such as the predictive value of the test and control
over the disease. Together, these studies show that when
the predictive value of the test and the control over the
disease (availability of cure/treatment) were perceived as
high, more interest in testing was expressed (Shaw and
Bassi 2001; Shiloh et al. 1999; Barnoy 2007). In addition,
worries about negative discrimination were also prevalent
among the German and Israeli groups.
German non-affected respondents expressed greater
scepticism than did Israeli respondents. For example, Ger-
man non-affected respondents agreed that responsibility for
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123kin generates moral conﬂict rather than moral duty; some of
them also believed there is a ‘‘right not to know’’ and
expressed worries about the emergence of a two-tiered
health market. In contrast, German affected respondents
were more categorical, sharing with Israeli affected
respondents a view of self-responsibility as a duty to know,
of responsibility for kin as moral duty, and of social
responsibility as requiring ‘positive discrimination.’
In Israel, unlike Germany, the views of respondents who
were not affected by genetic diseases were overall similar
to those of Israeli respondents affected by genetic diseases.
The ‘‘duty to know and tell’’ stresses this linkage by
reﬂecting as well as constructing a shared sense of genetic
risk.
In the ensuing conclusion we offer some preliminary
interpretations of these patterns and their implications.
Concluding remarks
Our ﬁndings complement and extend the accepted view of
Germany and Israel as opposing examples of bioethical
culture in relation to genetic testing. This study demon-
strates that professional opinions provide only one layer for
the comparison of cultures, a comparison which should
also include lay/affected people. While involving parallel
contentions to those raised by our respondents, the pro-
fessional ethical debate on what shapes responsibility in the
context of genetic testing of adults usually centered on the
notion of individual responsibility. The liberal intuition
that individuals have at least a right to ignore the genetic
information concerning themselves (Chadwick 2004) can
be challenged by the position that to make autonomous
choices, individuals should ﬁrst acquire all the relevant
genetic information concerning the situation they ﬁnd
themselves in (Rhodes 1998), as well as by a consequen-
tialist position which criticises ignoring such information
as potentially inﬂicting avoidable harm on the health of
one’s children (Takala and Ha ¨yry 2000).
The analysis of focus groups demonstrated the com-
plexity of the concept of responsibility and how it is
embedded in the social world of particular groups. Our
study highlighted various cultural and personal narratives
that underlie the multi-faceted notion of responsibility,
narratives which had a pivotal role in the moral delibera-
tions. In the context of self-responsibility, the moral con-
ﬂict and the right not to know in case no therapy exists—a
view expressed mainly by German lay respondents—could
be linked to what Lemke (2005) referred to as ‘genetic
fatalism’. This may represent the Christian ‘stewardship’
model associated with criticism of genetic interventions as
‘‘playing God’’ (Walter 1999). Alternatively, for most
people without a clear medical family history, ignoring
genetic information about hereditary properties can be
ethically advisable if they are willing to unconditionally
nurture a child whatever her genetic characteristics may be
(Vehmas 2001). The duty to know, as expressed by Israeli
lay/affected respondents, could be linked to the Jewish
support of medical efforts to intervene in nature (Gross and
Ravitsky 2003, p. 251).
In the context of family responsibility, the pivotal issue
was the ambivalence whether to tell or not to tell. Israeli
respondents developed a moral argument regarding the
duty to know and the obligation to tell as part of being a
member of a close-knit family—expecting to be told by
others in the family and feeling an obligation to tell them.
In a parallel manner, Hallowell (1999) described genetic
responsibility in the context of women seeking predictive
genetic counselling for breast cancer even while compro-
mising their own needs of ‘not knowing’ their risks for the
sake of relaying the genetic information to their kin. In
contrast, the German ambivalence could be linked to a
perception of relatively loose-knit, ethnically heteroge-
neous families, where the concept of care for your kin
includes a respect for being different, genetically as well as
personally. As genetic tests become knowledge that should
or should not be shared, it creates new options of acting but
also of power. Konrad (2003, 2005) and Taylor (2004) also
showed how pre-symptomatic genetic counselling for
Huntington’s Disease (HD) can turn into moral negotiation
within and between family members, involving complex
decision-making over the (non-)disclosure of genetic
information about their own and others’ health futures.
In the context of the responsibility of society, the shared
perception of ‘positive discrimination’ by Israeli respon-
dents could be linked to their communitarian sense of
belonging to an ‘‘at-risk population.’’ Strong reliance on a
collective body is here linked to moral expectations from
society and a sense of responsibility to the collective (Weiss
2002), also consistent with the strong sense of a duty to tell
other family members about their risk status. In contrast, the
skeptical outlook of some German respondents concerning
health disparities could be interpreted as related to the
perceived breakdown of social solidarity. At this moment in
the German history of health care, many Germans criticize
the ongoing development of a two-tiered system of health
care that allows the rich to receive better medicine and
better care by holding private health insurance policies (for
additional survey data see Schoen et al. 2009).
Finally, this study illustrates how responsibility, as a key
term in the moral deliberation, is embedded both in national
culture and lived experience. Some of the deliberations may
be related to different individual understandings of
responsibility, predictability and trust concerning genetic
testing of adults. However, in all three categories of
responsibility, the views of German affected respondents
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123were different from those of non-affected German respon-
dents but quite similar to those of Israeli affected respon-
dents. The lived experience of being affected, which also
includes perceived genetic risk, thus arguably produces a
common moral worldview that can transcend national
contrasts. Perhaps what this tells us is that the experience of
vulnerability enhances one’s perception of relationality, i.e.
of being part of a group. Being affected probably makes a
cognitive difference, constituting an epistemic authority
and a strong motivation for information acquisition
(Schicktanz et al. 2008). In a similar manner to the
knowledge claims of feminist standpoint or situated
knowledge theorists, critical race theorists and disability
studies perspectives (Harding 2004; Johnstone 2001),
affected people may warrant an ‘‘expert status’’ for their
own situation and concerns (Badcott 2005). This also has
implications for ethical norms grounded not just in the
professionals’ viewpoints but also in the perspectives of
patients.
In Israel, where the ‘‘Ashkenazi Jewish gene pool’’ has
been constructed by health professionals as especially
prone to inherited disorders, ‘genetic anxiety’ (or
‘responsibility,’ depending on one’s perspective) has been
boosted, creating a collective sense of risk in which the
‘elective’ uptake of genetic testing is exceptionally high
and seen by many as moral duty (Remennick 2006; Sher
et al. 2003). The duty to tell, as shared by Israeli respon-
dents, matches Israel’s Genetic Information Law (2000)
which, quite uniquely compared to international regulation,
prescribes that genetic information could be communicated
to third parties if it is ‘‘required for the maintenance of the
health of a relative or to improve such person’s health, and
for the prevention of death, illness or serious disability of
such relative, including an unborn relative.’’ Such duty-
based legal responsibility could also lend itself to Fou-
cauldian interpretation as a biopolitical fabrication of the
self and a symptom of bio-governmentality turning indi-
viduals into self-inspectors of themselves and their DNA
(Novas and Rose 2000). In our study, the view regarding
the ‘‘duty to know’’ encapsulated and emphasized the
general Israeli consensus regarding the beneﬁt of genetic
testing. A collective lay notion of ‘‘being affected,’’ which
requires further sociological analysis, could thus explain
why the Israeli lay morality of responsibility is in fact a
morality of being affected. This study implies that a multi-
faceted awareness of the variety of public views, including
the attitudes of those affected and not affected, warrants
attention for improving lay-professional communication,
tackling ethical questions, and formulating future policy.
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